Kian Vesteinsson’s Testimony for the National Election of the Commission of Inquiry for Cambodia, 22 July 2023

First, my thanks to the Commission on Inquiry for Cambodia for the invitation to join this important session on the July 2023 election. My name is Kian Vesteinsson. I am a senior research analyst at Freedom House. Freedom House is an independent organization founded in 1941 on the core conviction that freedom flourishes in democratic nations where governments are accountable to their people. Our work is built around three pillars: research and analysis on the threats to and opportunities for democracy; advocacy to governments, the private sector, and other powerful actors on how to protect fundamental freedoms; and direct support to frontline activists and human rights defenders around the world.

In July 2023, the Cambodian people will take to the polls in an election with an outcome that is near-certain: the consolidation of power by the ruling party, and an even greater threat to the human rights of Cambodians. I want to be very clear about the basic realities of this election. Prime Minister Hun Sen has held the premiership since 1985. His Cambodian People’s Party holds every seat in the legislature. In elections a decade ago, the Cambodia National Rescue Party nearly shook the CPP’s hold on government. Since then, Hun Sen and the CPP have worked to ensure that elections do not present a threat to their rule. Now, Cambodia is de facto a one-party state. The prospect of change to that status quo in the July 2023 election is remote. Freedom House’s research has found that Hun Sen and the CPP government have steadily undermined human rights in Cambodia. This decline is pronounced before, during, and after election periods. As such, this session comes at a critical time. It is critical that the international community understand what is at stake for the Cambodian people in the July 2023 elections, and act accordingly.

As example, consider the preceding Cambodian general elections in 2018. In the period ahead of voting, the country’s shaky democracy collapsed. Hun Sen’s government cracked down on the opposition, forced the closure of media outlets and NGOs, and arrested its critics. During and after the 2018 elections, political rights and civil liberties cratered in Cambodia. Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report ranks Cambodia at 24 out of a possible 100 points as of 2022, down from a peak of 32 points in 2016. Much of that decline is due to the steady of erosion of the Cambodian people’s political rights. Cambodia now ranks among the worst in the world for electoral processes and political pluralism. That decline has shaped the conditions of the 2023 balloting. Election Watch for the Digital Age is a Freedom House initiative to investigate the interplay between digital platforms and election integrity in key elections around world. A component of the project is our Election Vulnerability Index, which evaluates key election-related indicators with the aim of identifying specific areas of concern ahead of a country’s election. Cambodia has a score of 29 out of 100, with 100 representing the least vulnerability in terms of election integrity. The score reflects the CPP’s erosion of democratic procedures in Cambodia.

Now, I’ll turn to some of the key trends that Freedom House identifies as creating these deeply concerning conditions ahead of the July 2023 election. 

First, the CPP has strategically and systemically manipulated the conditions under which elections take place in order to favor their own success. In 2018, the CPP won every seat in both chambers in elections that were considered neither free nor fair by established international observers. This is not likely to change in 2022. Hun Sen and the CPP have sought to quash the country’s political opposition, particularly since 2013. Ahead of the 2018 election, the Supreme Court banned the main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party. Many CNRP leaders were arrested in the years that followed. Some Cambodians still bravely seek to participate in the country’s elections 16in independent political parties. In late 2021, opposition politicians revived the Candlelight Party, which had been defunct since its founder Sam Rainsy set it aside to form the CNRP. Now, the Candlelight Party is one of many in a fractured opposition that are set to contest the 2023 election. Cambodian voters have already shown their support for the Candlelight Party. In June 2022, people across the country turned out for commune-level elections, an important bellwether ahead of the 2023 voters. The Candlelight Party took 22 percent of the total popular vote, according to the NEC, with the CPP taking 74 percent. All signs indicate that the CPP is prepared to destabilize the Candlelight Party. Ahead of the June 2022 commune election, the NEC struck opposition candidates from voting lists. Opposition parties also alleged widespread voter suppression, intimidation, and vote-rigging. In the aftermath of the 2022 commune elections, the CPP took steps to undermine the opposition even further. The CPP and NEC filed separate defamation charges against Son Chhay, vice president of the Candlelight Party, for criticizing the conduct of the election. As of a December 2022 appeals court ruling, Chhay faces a fine of 4 million riels – about 1 million USD – to be paid to the CPP. In August 2022, the King signed a constitutional amendment into law that will further cement the CPP’s stranglehold on national politics. Under the previous constitution, the King appointed the prime minister from the majority party in the National Assembly based on the nomination of the Assembly’s president and assent of its two vice-presidents. The amended constitution places the power to nominate a prime minister directly in the hands of the majority party. As many in Cambodian civil society have said, this amendment was enforced by the CPP in an undemocratic process. The CPP did not consult the Cambodian people through a referendum or similar mechanism. In effect, the amendment will empower the CPP to set its agenda after the 2023 election even if the Candlelight Party and other opposition parties capture a share of the vote similar to June 2022. The amendment may serve as the next step in Hun Sen’s effort to secure his son Hun Manet as the successor to the premiership. Hun Sen and the CPP’s central committee have both designated Hun Manet as such. The amendment sets the stage for a dynastic and fundamentally undemocratic transfer of the premiership.

The second trend Freedom House research has found is the CPP’s yearslong campaign against independent Cambodian media. The ability of journalists to report freely on matters of public interest is a crucial indicator of democracy, both ahead of elections and outside of electoral periods. A free press can inform people of their leaders’ successes or failures, and provide a platform for the open exchange of information and ideas. The CPP has eroded media freedom to a breaking point. Since 2017, the government has deployed a variety of tactics — including lawsuits, website blocks, criminal prosecutions, massive tax bills, and occasionally violent attacks—to silence Khmer-language independent media. Journalists across the country face risk of arrest and harassment for their reporting. A 2021 survey found that a staggering 56 percent of journalists reported experiencing legal harassment because of their work. That is particularly the case for reporting that covers the very real harms Cambodian people face because of government corruption and repression. Ahead of the 2018 elections, the government shuttered the Cambodia Daily and 15 independent radio stations. These media sources were an important line for Cambodian people to access independent views and information untainted by the government line. The hammer came down again earlier this year, this time against Voice of Democracy, one of the few remaining independent Cambodian outlets. In February 2023, Hun Sen announced in a Facebook post that the government had revoked the operating license of VOD’s parent organization. The issue at hand was the outlet’s reporting on Hun Manet’s role in the government. The VOD closure is not unprecedented, but it is a landmark. In August 2022, the Cambodia office of the UN OHCHR released an important report on the state of press freedom in the country. The report noted that Cambodia’s media is “in a perilous state.” That peril is even greater now as we speak in March, and the months to come before July may bring even further restrictions. 

Third, the Hun Sen and the CPP have severely raised the costs for free expression and assembly in Cambodia. Members of the general public and prominent opposition figures alike face the risk of intimidation, arrest, prosecution, and multi-year prison sentences for expressing their views on political and social issues. Indeed, the government has launched a yearslong campaign to arrest and prosecute former CNRP members for their activities. Mass trials throughout 2021 and 2022 saw dozens of CNRP-affiliated activists sentenced to long prison terms over their opposition activism, including criticism of the government posted on social media. Take, for example, human rights lawyer and pro-democracy activist Theary Seng. Seng spent decades working to build a strong civil society in Cambodia. She also criticized Hun Sen and the CPP on social media and rallied support for the exiled CNRP leader Sam Rainsy. In response, authorities arrested Seng and sentenced her to six years imprisonment in a mass trial. More broadly, security forces respond to peaceful assembly with harsh measures. Demonstrators frequently experience threats, excessive violence, and arbitrary detention. Recent attention to the digital sphere suggests the Cambodian government is building up its legal and technical infrastructure for further control. The most recent draft of the cybercrime law imposes sharp criminal penalties on speech that the government deems adverse. It would also impose new obligations on service providers that may fuel deeper government surveillance. Similarly, the draft cybersecurity law contains provisions that could be abused by Cambodian authorities to obtain sensitive data from intermediaries. Meanwhile, the authorities appear to be pursuing its plan for a National Internet Gateway, which would centralize all internet traffic in Cambodia under government control. The NIG was imposed by sub-decree in February 2021 and postponed a year later. Though the current status of its implementation is unclear, the NIG system would force service providers to extend government control over online content. The NIG and the draft laws could set the stage for even greater curtailment of free expression and assembly in Cambodia.

As the election approaches, there are promising signs that the international community is alert to the dangers, Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, conducted his first official visit under the Special Procedures in August 2022. He met with stakeholders across the landscape of Cambodian politics, from Hun Sen to land rights activists, trade unions, and other human rights defenders. The SR’s end of mission statement is significant. He reports that the CPP’s course of action since 2017 constitutes “systemic control by the powers-that-be, leading to political and other distortions undermining the call for a pluralistic democracy.”

Indeed, the Cambodian people deserve to participate in pluralistic and transparent elections without interference. That is a remote prospect in 2023. As I’ve described, the CPP has seriously undermined political rights and civil liberties ahead of the July 2023 election. But authorities can still carry out their baseline obligation to ensure that Cambodians can vote with ease come summer. The Cambodian government should work to ensure that the July balloting takes place smoothly and without direct interference from officials. Cambodians should be able to discuss the elections, organize in political parties, and participate in the balloting without fear of harassment, intimidation, arrest, and prosecution. Cambodian authorities should also address discriminatory barriers to voting, and permit the presence of independent election monitors. But these baseline efforts alone are not enough to make this election free and fair.

It is critical that the international community understand the risks that the election presents for Cambodians and their enjoyment of their human rights. Before, during, and after the election, governments and policymakers around the world should work to support the Cambodian people. Governments around the world should direct funding toward programs that strengthen democracy, particularly at critical junctures like elections. Where political institutions are weakened and governments struggle to respond to citizens’ needs, efforts to support civil society are at a greater risk of failure. Democracies should provide civil society and citizen-led social movements with technical assistance and training on issues like coalition and constituency building, advocacy, organizational development, and physical and digital security. This programming should also increase support for technologies that help individuals in closed environments circumvent government censorship, protect themselves against surveillance, and overcome restrictions on connectivity. Such tools should be open-source, user-friendly, and locally responsive in order to ensure high levels of security and use. Democracies should also work to support Cambodia’s independent media, including media operating in exile. VOD is only the latest independent outlet to be shuttered by the Cambodian government, and it will not be the last. Democracies can provide outlets with financial assistance and innovative financing models, technical support, skills training, and mentoring. They should also expand protections for journalists who face physical attacks and harassment, including by supporting the creation of emergency visas for those at risk, as well as technology to circumvent censorship and evade surveillance. It is also critical that democratic governments engage in public campaigns to raise awareness of political prisoners in Cambodia and lobby for their release.

Companies that operate or provide services in Cambodia should also be prepared to support Cambodians facing repression during the election period. As a start, that should resist government orders to shut down internet connectivity, ban digital services, and unduly turn over data or restrict user accounts and content. Service providers should use all available legal channels to challenge such requests from state agencies, whether they are official or informal, especially those that relate to human rights defenders, activists, civil society, journalists, or other at-risk accounts. Companies that provide social media and communications platforms should work with Cambodian civil society to monitor and respond to dangerous speech online and disinformation campaigns from government actors. Such collaborations can also work to provide voters with access to reliable sources of information online.

Much is at stake for the Cambodian people in the July 2023 election, and it is deeply important that international community be prepared to respond. I will conclude there, with thanks to the Commission for the opportunity to share Freedom House’s perspective at this critical juncture.